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Abstract— Successful negotiators prepare by determining their
position along five dimensions: Legitimacy, Options, Goals, Inde-
pendence, and Commitment. We model business relationships in
terms of these dimensions and two primitive concepts: intimacy
(degree of closeness) and balance (degree of fairness). The
intimacy is a pair of matrices that evaluate both an agent’s
contribution to the relationship and its opponent’s contribution
each from an information view and from a utilitarian view across
the five dimensions. The balance is the difference between these
matrices. A relationship strategy maintains a target intimacy for
each relationship that an agent would like the relationship to
move towards in future. The negotiation strategy maintains a set
of Options that are in-line with the current intimacy level, and
then tactics wrap the Options in argumentation with the aim
of attaining a successful deal and manipulating the successive
negotiation balances towards the target intimacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we model long term relationships that are founded
on successive negotiation encounters. The model is grounded
on results from business and psychological studies [1], [12],
[7], and acknowledges that negotiation is an information
exchange process as well as a utility exchange process [11],
[10]. We believe that if agents are to succeed in real application
domains they have to reconcile both views: informational and
game-theoretical.
Our aim is to model relationships between agents that
represent human principals, and thus we want their behaviour
to be comprehensible by humans and to respect usual hu-
man negotiation procedures, whilst being consistent with,
and somehow extending, game theoretical and information
theoretical results. In this sense, agents are not just utility
maximisers, but aim at building long lasting relationships with
progressing levels of intimacy that determine what balance in
information and resource sharing is acceptable to them.
Negotiation strategies can naturally be seen as procedures
that select tactics used to attain a successful deal and to reach
a target intimacy level. It is common in human settings to
use tactics that compensate for unbalances in one dimension
of a negotiation with unbalances in another dimension. In
this sense, humans aim at a general sense of fairness in an
interaction.
In Section II we outline the aspects of human negotiation
modelling that we cover in this work. Section III explains
in outline the architecture and the concepts of intimacy and
balance, and how they influence the negotiation. Section IV
contains a description of the different metrics used in the agent
model including intimacy. Finally, Section V outlines how
strategies and tactics use the relationship model, intimacy and
balance.
II. HUMAN NEGOTIATION
Before a negotiation starts human negotiators prepare the
dialogic exchanges that can be made along the five dimensions
[6]:
• Legitimacy. What information is relevant to the negoti-
ation process? What are the persuasive arguments about
the fairness of the options?
• Options. What are the possible agreements we can ac-
cept?
• Goals. What are the underlying things we need or care
about? What are our goals?
• Independence. What will we do if the negotiation fails?
What alternatives have we got?
• Commitment. What outstanding commitments do we
have?
Negotiation dialogues, in this context, exchange dialogical
moves, i.e. messages, with the intention of getting information
about the opponent or giving away information about us
along these five dimensions: request for information, propose
options, inform about interests, issue promises, appeal to
standards . . . . A key part of any negotiation process is to
build a model of our opponent(s) along these dimensions.
All utterances agents make during a negotiation give away
information about their current model, that is, about their
legitimacy, options, goals, independence, and commitments.
Also, several utterances can have a utilitarian interpretation
in the sense that an agent can associate a preferential gain
to them. For instance, an offer may inform our negotiation
opponent about our willingness to sign a contract in the terms
expressed in the offer, and at the same time the opponent can
compute what is its associated expected utilitarian gain. These
two views: information-based and utility-based, are central in
the model proposed in this paper.
A. Intimacy and Balance in relationships
There is evidence from psychological studies that humans
seek a balance in their negotiation relationships. The classical
view [1] is that people perceive resource allocations as being
distributively fair (i.e. well balanced) if they are proportional
to inputs or contributions (i.e. equitable). However, more
recent studies [12], [13] show that humans follow a richer set
of norms of distributive justice depending on their intimacy
level: equity, equality, and need. Equity being the allocation
proportional to the effort (e.g. the profit of a company goes
to the stock holders proportional to their investment), equality
being the allocation in equal amounts (e.g. two friends eat the
same amount of a cake cooked by one of them), and need
being the allocation proportional to the need for the resource
(e.g. in case of food scarcity, a mother gives all food to her
baby). For instance, if we are in a purely economic setting (low
intimacy) we might request equity for the Options dimension
but could accept equality in the Goals dimension.
The perception of a relation being in balance (i.e. fair)
depends strongly on the nature of the social relationships
between individuals (i.e. the intimacy level). In purely eco-
nomical relationships (e.g., business), equity is perceived as
more fair; in relations where joint action or fostering of social
relationships are the goal (e.g. friends), equality is perceived
as more fair; and in situations where personal development
or personal welfare are the goal (e.g. family), allocations are
usually based on need.
We believe that the perception of balance in dialogues (in
negotiation or otherwise) is grounded on social relationships,
and that every dimension of an interaction between humans
can be correlated to the social closeness, or intimacy, between
the parties involved. According to the previous studies, the
more intimacy across the five dimensions the more the need
norm is used, and the less intimacy the more the equity norm is
used. This might be part of our social evolution. There is ample
evidence that when human societies evolved from a hunter-
gatherer structure1 to a shelter-based one2 the probability of
survival increased when food was scarce.
In this context, we can clearly see that, for instance, families
exchange not only goods but also information and knowledge
based on need, and that few families would consider their
relationships as being unbalanced, and thus unfair, when there
is a strong asymmetry in the exchanges (a mother explaining
everything to her children, or buying toys, does not expect
reciprocity). In the case of partners there is some evidence
[3] that the allocations of goods and burdens (i.e. positive and
negative utilities) are perceived as fair, or in balance, based
on equity for burdens and equality for goods.
The perceived balance in a negotiation dialogue allows
negotiators to infer information about their opponent, about its
stance, and to compare their relationships with all negotiators.
For instance, if we perceive that every time we request
information it is provided, and that no significant questions are
1In its purest form, individuals in these societies collect food and consume
it when and where it is found. This is a pure equity sharing of the resources,
the gain is proportional to the effort.
2In these societies there are family units, around a shelter, that represent the
basic food sharing structure. Usually, food is accumulated at the shelter for
future use. Then the food intake depends more on the need of the members.
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returned, or no complaints about not receiving information are
given, then that probably means that our opponent perceives
our social relationship to be very close. Alternatively, we can
detect what issues are causing a burden to our opponent by
observing an imbalance in the information or utilitarian senses
on that issue.
III. AGENT ARCHITECTURE
A multiagent system {α, β1, . . . , βn, ξ, θ1, . . . , θt}, contains
an agent α that interacts with other argumentation agents,
βi, information providing agents, θj , and an institutional
agent, ξ, that represents the institution where we assume
the interactions happen [2]. The institutional agent reports
promptly and honestly on what actually occurs after an agent
signs a contract, or makes some other form of commitment.
In Section III-A this enables us to measure the difference
between an utterance and a subsequent observation. Agents
have a probabilistic first-order internal language L used to
represent a world model, Mt. A generic information-based
architecture is described in detail in [11].
The agent architecture is shown in Figure 1. Agent α acts in
response to a need that is expressed in terms of the ontology.
A need may be exogenous such as a need to trade profitably
and may be triggered by another agent offering to trade, or
endogenous such as α deciding that it owns more wine than
it requires. Needs trigger α’s goal/plan proactive reasoning,
while other messages are dealt with by α’s reactive reasoning.3
Each plan prepares for the negotiation by assembling the
contents of a ‘briefcase’ that the agent ‘carries’ into the
negotiation4. The relationship strategy determines which agent
to negotiate with for a given need; it uses risk management
analysis to preserve a strategic set of trading relationships for
each mission-critical need — this is not detailed here. For
3Each of α’s plans and reactions contain constructors for an initial world
model Mt. Mt is then maintained from percepts received using update
functions that transform percepts into constraints on Mt — for details, see
[10], [11].
4Empirical evidence shows that in human negotiation, better outcomes are
achieved by skewing the opening Options in favour of the proposer. We are
unaware of any empirical investigation of this hypothesis for autonomous
agents in real trading scenarios.
each trading relationship this strategy generates a relationship
target that is expressed in the framework as a desired level of
intimacy to be achieved in the long term.
Each negotiation consists of a dialogue, Ψt, between two
agents with agent α contributing utterance µ and the partner
β contributing µ′. Each dialogue, Ψt, is evaluated using the
framework in terms of the value of Ψt to both α and β —
see Section IV-B. The negotiation strategy then determines the
current set of Options {δi}, and then the tactics, guided by the
negotiation target, decide which, if any, of these Options to
put forward and wraps them in argumentation dialogue — see
Section V. We now describe two of the distributions in Mt
that support offer exchange.
Pt(acc(α, β, χ, δ)) estimates the probability that α should
accept proposal δ in satisfaction of her need χ, where δ =
(a, b) is a pair of commitments, a for α and b for β. α will ac-
cept δ if: Pt(acc(α, β, χ, δ)) > c, for level of certainty c. This
estimate is compounded from subjective and objective views
of acceptability. The subjective estimate takes account of: the
extent to which the enactment of δ will satisfy α’s need χ, how
much δ is ‘worth’ to α, and the extent to which α believes
that she will be in a position to execute her commitment a
[10], [11]. Sα(β, a) is a random variable denoting α’s estimate
of β’s subjective valuation of a over some finite, numerical
evaluation space. The objective estimate captures whether δ
is acceptable on the open market, and variable Uα(b) denotes
α’s open-market valuation of the enactment of commitment
b, again taken over some finite numerical valuation space. We
also consider needs, the variable Tα(β, a) denotes α’s estimate
of the strength of β’s motivating need for the enactment of
commitment a over a valuation space. Then for δ = (a, b):
Pt(acc(α, β, χ, δ)) =
Pt
((
Tα(β, a)
Tα(α, b)
)h
×
(
Sα(α, b)
Sα(β, a)
)g
× Uα(b)
Uα(a)
≥ s
)
(1)
where g ∈ [0, 1] is α’s greed, h ∈ [0, 1] is α’s degree of
altruism, and s ≈ 1 is derived from the stance5 described in
Section V. The parameters g and h are independent. We can
imagine a relationship that begins with g = 1 and h = 0. Then
as the agents share increasing amounts of their information
about their open market valuations g gradually reduces to 0,
and then as they share increasing amounts of information about
their needs h increases to 1. The basis for the acceptance
criterion has thus developed from equity to equality, and then
to need.
Pt(acc(β, α, δ)) estimates the probability that β would
accept δ, by observing β’s responses. For example, if β
sends the message Offer(δ1) then α derives the constraint:
{Pt(acc(β, α, δ1)) = 1} on the distribution Pt(β, α, δ), and
if this is a counter offer to a former offer of α’s, δ0, then:
{Pt(acc(β, α, δ0)) = 0}. In the not-atypical special case of
5If α chooses to inflate her opening Options then this is achieved in
Section V by increasing the value of s. If s  1 then a deal may not be
possible. This illustrates the well-known inefficiency of bilateral bargaining
established analytically by Myerson and Satterthwaite in 1983.
multi-issue bargaining where the agents’ preferences over the
individual issues only are known and are complementary to
each other’s, maximum entropy reasoning can be applied
to estimate the probability that any multi-issue δ will be
acceptable to β by enumerating the possible worlds that
represent β’s “limit of acceptability” [5].
A. Updating the World Model Mt
α’s world model consists of probability distributions that
represent its uncertainty in the world state. α is interested in
the degree to which an utterance accurately describes what will
subsequently be observed. All observations about the world
are received as utterances from an all-truthful institution agent
ξ. For example, if β communicates the goal “I am hungry”
and the subsequent negotiation terminates with β purchasing a
book from α (by ξ advising α that a certain amount of money
has been credited to α’s account) then α may conclude that the
goal that β chose to satisfy was something other than hunger.
So, α’s world model contains probability distributions that
represent its uncertain expectations of what will be observed
on the basis of utterances received.
We represent the relationship between utterance, ϕ, and sub-
sequent observation, ϕ′, by Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) ∈ Mt, where ϕ′ and ϕ
may be ontological categories in the interest of computational
feasibility. For example, if ϕ is “I will deliver a bucket of fish
to you tomorrow” then the distribution P(ϕ′|ϕ) need not be
over all possible things that β might do, but could be over
ontological categories that summarise β’s possible actions.
In the absence of in-coming utterances, the conditional prob-
abilities, Pt(ϕ′|ϕ), should tend to ignorance as represented by
a decay limit distribution D(ϕ′|ϕ). α may have background
knowledge concerning D(ϕ′|ϕ) as t → ∞, otherwise α may
assume that it has maximum entropy whilst being consistent
with the data. In general, given a distribution, Pt(Xi), and a
decay limit distribution D(Xi), Pt(Xi) decays by:
Pt+1(Xi) = ∆i(D(Xi),Pt(Xi)) (2)
where ∆i is the decay function for the Xi satisfying the
property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) = D(Xi). For example, ∆i
could be linear: Pt+1(Xi) = (1− νi)×D(Xi) + νi×Pt(Xi),
where νi < 1 is the decay rate for the i’th distribution. Either
the decay function or the decay limit distribution could also
be a function of time: ∆ti and Dt(Xi).
Suppose that α receives an utterance µ = illoc(α, β, ϕ, t)
from agent β at time t. Suppose that α attaches an epistemic
belief Rt(α, β, µ) to µ — this probability takes account
of α’s level of personal caution. We model the update of
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) in two cases, one for observations given ϕ, second
for observations given φ in the semantic neighbourhood of ϕ.
B. Update of Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) given ϕ
First, if ϕk is observed then α may set Pt+1(ϕk|ϕ) to
some value d where {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . , ϕm} is the set of all
possible observations. We estimate the complete posterior
distribution Pt+1(ϕ′|ϕ) by applying the principle of minimum
relative entropy6 as follows. Let ~p(µ) be the distribution:
arg min~x
∑
j xj log
xj
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)j that satisfies the constraint ~p(µ)k
= d. Then let ~q(µ) be the distribution:
~q(µ) = Rt(α, β, µ)× ~p(µ) + (1− Rt(α, β, µ))× Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
and then let:
~r(µ) =
{
~q(µ) if ~q(µ) is more interesting than Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) otherwise
A general measure of whether ~q(µ) is more interesting
than Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) is: K(~q(µ)‖D(ϕ′|ϕ)) > K(Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)‖D(ϕ′|ϕ)),
where K(~x‖~y) = ∑j xj ln xjyj is the Kullback-Leibler distance
between two probability distributions ~x and ~y.
Finally incorporating Eqn. 2 we obtain the method for
updating a distribution Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) on receipt of a message µ:
Pt+1(ϕ′|ϕ) = ∆i(D(ϕ′|ϕ), ~r(µ)) (3)
This procedure deals with integrity decay, and with two
probabilities: first, the probability z in the utterance µ, and
second the belief Rt(α, β, µ) that α attached to µ.
C. Update of Pt(φ′|φ) given ϕ
The sim method: Given as above µ = illoc(α, β, ϕ, t) and
the observation ϕk we define the vector ~t by
ti = Pt(φi|φ)+(1− | Sim(ϕk, ϕ)−Sim(φi, φ) |) ·Sim(ϕk, φ)
with {φ1, φ2, . . . , φp} the set of all possible observations in
the context of φ and i = 1, . . . , p. ~t is not a probability
distribution. The multiplying factor Sim(ϕ′, φ) limits the
variation of probability to those formulae whose ontological
context is not too far away from the observation. The posterior
Pt+1(φ′|φ) is obtained with Equation 3 with ~r(µ) defined to
be the normalisation of ~t.
The valuation method: For a given φk, wexp(φk) =∑m
j=1 Pt(φj |φk) · w(φj) is α’s expectation of the value of
what will be observed given that β has stated that φk will be
observed, for some measure w. Now suppose that, as before,
α observes ϕk after agent β has stated ϕ. α revises the prior
estimate of the expected valuation wexp(φk) in the light of the
observation ϕk to:
(wrev(φk) | (ϕk|ϕ)) =
g(wexp(φk),Sim(φk, ϕ), w(φk), w(ϕ), wi(ϕk))
for some function ~g — the idea being, for example, that if the
execution, ϕk, of the commitment, ϕ, to supply cheese was
devalued then α’s expectation of the value of a commitment,
6Given a probability distribution ~q, the minimum relative entropy distri-
bution ~p = (p1, . . . , pI) subject to a set of J linear constraints ~g =
{gj(~p) = ~aj · ~p − cj = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J (that must include the constraintP
i pi − 1 = 0) is: ~p = argmin~r
P
j rj log
rj
qj
. This may be calculated
by introducing Lagrange multipliers ~λ: L(~p, ~λ) =
P
j pj log
pj
qj
+ ~λ · ~g.
Minimising L, { ∂L
∂λj
= gj(~p) = 0}, j = 1, . . . , J is the set of given
constraints ~g, and a solution to ∂L
∂pi
= 0, i = 1, . . . , I leads eventually to ~p.
Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that is convenient
when the data is sparse [4] and encapsulates common-sense reasoning [8].
φ, to supply wine should decrease. We estimate the posterior
by applying the principle of minimum relative entropy as for
Equation 3, where the distribution ~p(µ) = ~p(φ′|φ) satisfies the
constraint:
p∑
j=1
p(ϕ′,ϕ)j · wi(φj) =
g(wexp(φk),Sim(φk, ϕ), w(φk), w(ϕ), wi(ϕk))
IV. SUMMARY MEASURES
A dialogue, Ψt, between agents α and β is a sequence of
inter-related utterances in context. A relationship, Ψ∗t, is a
sequence of dialogues. We first measure the confidence that
an agent has for another by observing, for each utterance,
the difference between what is said (the utterance) and what
subsequently occurs (the observation). Second we evaluate
each dialogue as it progresses in terms of the framework —
this evaluation employs the confidence measures. Finally we
define the intimacy of a relationship as an aggregation of the
value of its component dialogues.
A. Confidence
Confidence measures generalise what are commonly called
trust, reliability and reputation measures into a single com-
putational framework that spans the five categories. In Sec-
tion IV-B confidence measures are applied to valuing fulfil-
ment of promises in the Legitimacy category — we formerly
called this “honour” [10], to the execution of commitments —
we formerly called this “trust” [9], and to valuing dialogues
in the Goals category — we formerly called this “reliability”
[10].
Ideal observations. Consider a distribution of observations
that represent α’s “ideal” in the sense that it is the best that
α could reasonably expect to observe. This distribution will
be a function of α’s context with β denoted by e, and is
PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e). Here we measure the relative entropy between this
ideal distribution, PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e), and the distribution of expected
observations, Pt(ϕ′|ϕ). That is:
C(α, β, ϕ) = 1−
∑
ϕ′
PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e) log
PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e)
Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) (4)
where the “1” is an arbitrarily chosen constant being the
maximum value that this measure may have. This equation
measures confidence for a single statement ϕ. It makes sense
to aggregate these values over a class of statements, say over
those ϕ that are in the ontological context o, that is ϕ ≤ o:
C(α, β, o) = 1−
∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ) [1− C(α, β, ϕ)]∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ)
where Ptβ(ϕ) is a probability distribution over the space of
statements that the next statement β will make to α is ϕ.
Similarly, for an overall estimate of β’s confidence in α:
C(α, β) = 1−
∑
ϕ
Ptβ(ϕ) [1− C(α, β, ϕ)]
Preferred observations. The previous measure requires that
an ideal distribution, PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e), has to be specified for each
ϕ. Here we measure the extent to which the observation ϕ′
is preferable to the original statement ϕ. Given a predicate
Prefer(c1, c2, e) meaning that α prefers c1 to c2 in environ-
ment e. Then if ϕ ≤ o:
C(α, β, ϕ) =
∑
ϕ′
Pt(Prefer(ϕ′, ϕ, o))Pt(ϕ′|ϕ)
and:
C(α, β, o) =
∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ)C(α, β, ϕ)∑
ϕ:ϕ≤o Ptβ(ϕ)
Certainty in observation. Here we measure the consistency
in expected acceptable observations, or “the lack of expected
uncertainty in those possible observations that are better
than the original statement”. If ϕ ≤ o let: Φ+(ϕ, o, κ) =
{ϕ′ | Pt(Prefer(ϕ′, ϕ, o)) > κ} for some constant κ, and:
C(α, β, ϕ) = 1 +
1
B∗
·
∑
ϕ′∈Φ+(ϕ,o,κ)
Pt+(ϕ′|ϕ) logPt+(ϕ′|ϕ)
where Pt+(ϕ′|ϕ) is the normalisation of Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) for ϕ′ ∈
Φ+(ϕ, o, κ),
B∗ =
{
1 if |Φ+(ϕ, o, κ)| = 1
log |Φ+(ϕ, o, κ)| otherwise
As above we aggregate this measure for observations in a
particular context o, and measure confidence as before.
Computational Note. The various measures given above
involve extensive calculations. For example, Eqn. 4 contains∑
ϕ′ that sums over all possible observations ϕ
′. We obtain
a more computationally friendly measure by appealing to the
structure of the ontology, and the right-hand side of Eqn. 4
may be approximated to:
1−
∑
ϕ′:Sim(ϕ′,ϕ)≥η
Ptη,I(ϕ′|ϕ, e) log
Ptη,I(ϕ′|ϕ, e)
Ptη(ϕ′|ϕ)
where Ptη,I(ϕ′|ϕ, e) is the normalisation of PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e) for
Sim(ϕ′, ϕ) ≥ η, and similarly for Ptη(ϕ′|ϕ). The extent of this
calculation is controlled by the parameter η. An even tighter
restriction may be obtained with: Sim(ϕ′, ϕ) ≥ η and ϕ′ ≤ ψ
for some ψ.
B. Valuing negotiation dialogues
Suppose that a negotiation commences at time s, and by time t
a string of utterances, Φt = 〈µ1, . . . , µn〉 has been exchanged
between agent α and agent β. This negotiation dialogue is
evaluated by α in the context of α’s world model at time s,
Ms, and the environment e that includes utterances that may
have been received from other agents in the system including
the information sources {θi}. Let Ψt = (Φt,Ms, e), then α
estimates the value of this dialogue to itself in the context of
Ms and e as a 2× 5 array Vα(Ψt) where:
Vx(Ψt) =
(
ILx (Ψ
t) IOx (Ψ
t) IGx (Ψ
t) IIx(Ψ
t) ICx (Ψ
t)
ULx (Ψ
t) UOx (Ψ
t) UGx (Ψ
t) U Ix(Ψ
t) UCx (Ψ
t)
)
where the I(·) and U(·) functions are information-based and
utility-based measures respectively as we now describe. α
estimates the value of this dialogue to β as Vβ(Ψt) by
assuming that β’s reasoning apparatus mirrors its own.
In general terms, the information-based valuations measure
the reduction in uncertainty, or information gain, that the
dialogue gives to each agent, they are expressed in terms of
decrease in entropy that can always be calculated. The utility-
based valuations measure utility gain are expressed in terms
of “some suitable” utility evaluation function U(·) that can
be difficult to define. This is one reason why the utilitarian
approach has no natural extension to the management of
argumentation that is achieved here by our information-based
approach. For example, if α receives the utterance “Today is
Tuesday” then this may be translated into a constraint on a
single distribution, and the resulting decrease in entropy is
the information gain. Attaching a utilitarian measure to this
utterance may not be so simple.
C. Intimacy and Balance
The balance in a negotiation dialogue, Ψt, is defined as:
Bαβ(Ψt) = Vα(Ψt) 	 Vβ(Ψt) for an element-by-element
difference operator 	 that respects the structure of V (Ψt).
The intimacy between agents α and β, I∗tαβ , is the pattern
of the two 2 × 5 arrays V ∗tα and V ∗tβ that are computed
by an update function as each negotiation round terminates,
I∗tαβ =
(
V ∗tα , V
∗t
β
)
. If Ψt terminates at time t:
V ∗t+1x = ν × Vx(Ψt) + (1− ν)× V ∗tx (5)
where ν is the learning rate, and x = α, β. Additionally, V ∗tx
continually decays by: V ∗t+1x = τ × V ∗tx + (1 − τ) × Dx,
where x = α, β; τ is the decay rate, and Dx is a 2 × 5
array being the decay limit distribution for the value to agent
x of the intimacy of the relationship in the absence of any
interaction. Dx is the reputation of agent x. The relationship
balance between agents α and β is: B∗tαβ = V
∗t
α 	 V ∗tβ . In
particular, the intimacy determines values for the parameters
g and h in Equation 1. As a simple example, if both IOα (Ψ
∗t)
and IOβ (Ψ
∗t) increase then g decreases, and as the remaining
eight information-based components increase, h increases.
The notion of balance may be applied to pairs of utterances
by treating them as degenerate dialogues. In simple multi-
issue bargaining the equitable information revelation strategy
generalises the tit-for-tat strategy in single-issue bargaining,
and extends to a tit-for-tat argumentation strategy by applying
the same principle across the framework.
V. STRATEGIES AND TACTICS
Each negotiation has to achieve two goals. First it may be
intended to achieve some contractual outcome. Second it will
aim to contribute to the growth, or decline, of the relationship
intimacy.
We now describe in greater detail the contents of the “Nego-
tiation” box in Figure 1. The negotiation literature consistently
advises that an agent’s behaviour should not be predictable
even in close, intimate relationships. The required variation
of behaviour is normally described as varying the negotiation
stance that informally varies from “friendly guy” to “tough
guy”. The stance is shown in Figure 1, it injects bounded
random noise into the process, where the bound tightens as
intimacy increases. The stance, Stαβ , is a 2 × 5 matrix of
randomly chosen multipliers, each ≈ 1, that perturbs α’s
actions. The value in the (x, y) position in the matrix, where
x = I, U and y = L,O,G, I,C, is chosen at random from
[ 1
l(I∗tαβ ,x,y)
, l(I∗tαβ , x, y)] where l(I
∗t
αβ , x, y) is the bound, and
I∗tαβ is the intimacy.
The negotiation strategy is concerned with maintaining a
working set of Options. If the set of options is empty then α
will quit the negotiation. α perturbs the acceptance machinery
(see Section III) by deriving s from the Stαβ matrix such as
the value at the (I,O) position. In line with the comment in
Footnote 4, in the early stages of the negotiation α may decide
to inflate her opening Options. This is achieved by increasing
the value of s in Equation 1. The following strategy uses the
machinery described in Section III. Fix h, g, s and c, set the
Options to the empty set, let Dts = {δ | Pt(acc(α, β, χ, δ) >
c}, then:
• repeat the following as many times as desired: add
δ = arg maxx{Pt(acc(β, α, x)) | x ∈ Dts} to Options,
remove {y ∈ Dts | Sim(y, δ) < k} for some k from Dts
By using Pt(acc(β, α, δ)) this strategy reacts to β’s history of
Propose and Reject utterances.
Negotiation tactics are concerned with selecting some Op-
tions and wrapping them in argumentation. Prior interactions
with agent β will have produced an intimacy pattern expressed
in the form of
(
V ∗tα , V
∗t
β
)
. Suppose that the relationship target
is (T ∗tα , T
∗t
β ). Following from Equation 5, α will want to
achieve a negotiation target, Nβ(Ψt) such that: ν ·Nβ(Ψt) +
(1− ν) · V ∗tβ is “a bit on the T ∗tβ side of” V ∗tβ :
Nβ(Ψt) =
ν − κ
ν
V ∗tβ ⊕
κ
ν
T ∗tβ (6)
for small κ ∈ [0, ν] that represents α’s desired rate of
development for her relationship with β. Nβ(Ψt) is a 2 × 5
matrix containing variations in the five dimensions that α
would like to reveal to β during Ψt (e.g. I’ll pass a bit
more information on options than usual, I’ll be stronger in
concessions on options, etc.). It is reasonable to expect β to
progress towards her target at the same rate and Nα(Ψt) is
calculated by replacing β by α in Equation 6. Nα(Ψt) is
what α hopes to receive from β during Ψt. This gives a
negotiation balance target of: Nα(Ψt) 	 Nβ(Ψt) that can
be used as the foundation for reactive tactics by striving to
maintain this balance across the five dimensions. A cautious
tactic could use the balance to bound the response µ to each
utterance µ′ from β by the constraint: Vα(µ′) 	 Vβ(µ) ≈
Stαβ ⊗ (Nα(Ψt) 	 Nβ(Ψt)), where ⊗ is element-by-element
matrix multiplication, and Stαβ is the stance. A less neurotic
tactic could attempt to achieve the target negotiation balance
over the anticipated complete dialogue. If a balance bound
requires negative information revelation in one category then
α will contribute nothing to it, and will leave this to the natural
decay to the reputation D as described above.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have introduced a model of relationships
that uses information and game-theoretical measures. It is
grounded on business and psychological studies and introduces
the concepts of intimacy and balance as key elements in under-
standing what is a negotiation strategy and tactic. Negotiation
is understood as a dialogue that affect five basic dimensions:
Legitimacy, Options, Goals, Independence, and Commitment.
We are currently exploring the use of this model as an
extension of a currently widespread eProcurement software
commercialised by a spin-off company of the laboratory of
one of the authors. This tool has only a utilitarian modeling of
the negotiation interactions and has motivated some criticisms
from its users about the lack of modeling of long-lasting
relationships that our model could solve.
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